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INTRODUCTION

This thesis deals with the role of the
JOS as the principal

military advisers of the executive and
legislative branches of the
U.S.

government.

It

concentrates on the JSC’s perception of Soviet

military and political intentions and capabilities
in the postwar
era and on the JCS’s military proposals regarding
the external

threat.

The purpose of the thesis is to assess the JCS’s
role

substantively rather than to evaluate the relative role of the JCS
as an agency amongst other key agencies dealing with foreign
policy.

Chapter one provides first

a

short introduction to the JCS;

second, an outline of the role that military men and military

considerations have played in the postwar era, emphasizing the views
on the JCS, and third, the arguments for choosing this particular

focus on the JCS.

Chapters two through four provide

a

chronological treatment of

the JCS’ perception of the external threat during the first five

years of the postwar era, emphasizing the years 19^6,
Each chapter starts with

a

19^8 and 1950.

short outline of the conditions and state

of the international system and US-USSR relations, in order to

provide understanding of the situation the JCS was faced with in the

particular year.

Each chapter deals with one aspect of the

evaluation of the external threat of particular concern to the JCS.

1

2

Chapter two deals with the JCS's perception
of Soviet intentions
in the postwar period.

First, there is

a

discussion of the origins

of the cold war and of the military perception;
second, an outline
of the setting of the year

19146

in terms of

conditions of the new

international system and the state of US-USSR relations; third,
the
JCS’s perception of Soviet postwar political and military

intentions; fourth, evidence provided by the JCS for the changing

perception of Soviet threat; and fifth, the perception of the Soviet
intentions, in terms of key individuals in the government.
Chapter three deals with the proposals of the JCS in regard to

military planning.

First, the setting of the year 1948 is described

in terms of the conditions of the international

system and the still

deteriorating relations between the US and the USSR; second, the JCS
perception of the external threat is noted in light of the first
cold war crises of 1948; third, the JCS planners’

measures for

a

general war as

a

preoccupation with

consequence of Soviet military

aggressions is indicated by various warplans; and fourth, below the
institutional level, it deals with the impact of individual services
and key military figures on warplanning.

Chapter four examines the JCS perception of Soviet capabilities
in

the year 1950.

It

examines first the international system and

the deteriorating relationship between the superpowers producing the

first climax of the cold war in the Korean War; second, the

3

implications of the Soviet atomic test and
the "fall of China" in
terms of JCS perception of Soviet intentions
and capabilities;
third, the revision of the perceptions
as

a

consequence of the

invasion of South Korea, and fourth, NSC 68 and
the increased

militarization of the cold war.
Chapter five provides

a

short resume of each of the chapters and

concludes by investigating the sources of the JCS
perception.

.

CHAPTER

I

STRUCTURE AND VIEWS

The three key actors in defense decision making are the

President, the Congress and the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
(JCS).

Despite being the top military advisers the JCS

I'lS

enjoyed

the least scholarly attention, and the least public attention for

that matter too.(l) Moreover, most of the attention the JCS has

gotten is from people with some kind of professional military

background and affiliation. (2)

The Joint Ch i e f s of Staff

In order to understand the JCS perception of the Soviet Union in

the immediate postwar period, it is necessary to review briefly the

origins, function and present form of the JCS.

The Organizational Development of the JCS.
JCS,

The roots of the present

the Joint Board was established in 1903 following the

Spanish-Amer ican

V/ar

,

1898-1900.

As it was the case in

4

19^7i

the

.

(

5

interservice board was made permanent
to fulfill the need of

coordination between the armed services
in order to carry out their
vastly enlarged commitments as

a

consequence of the wars.

3

)

By 1938, the Joint Board had been
reduced to a formal medium for

passing recommendations to the two
Secretaries between whom

agreement and cooperation was necessary for
coordination of the
armed forces, for which purpose the Board
had been crested. (iO At
the time of Pearl Harbor the only joint
authority linking the armed

services was the President as Commander-in-Chief

,

step too high for

practical purposes which had no supporting staff
organization.

At

the Arcadia Conference, 22 December 1941 to 14 Januar
1942, between
the British and the Americans, the Combined Chiefs
of Staff,

was created to coordinate the war effort.

According to

a

(CCS),

paper

issued at the Conference on the "Post-Arcadia Collaboration", the
CCS was composed of the British Chiefs of Staff and their "United

States opposite members". (5) This was the first time the JCS was

mentioned
In February

executive order.

1942, the JCS was born informally by a Presidential

The JCS was to be composed of the Chief of Staff

of the Army, (General George

Operations, (Admiral Ernest

C.

J.

Marshall), the Chief of Naval
King), and the Chief of the Army Air

Force, (General of the Army Henry H.

Arnold).

As the Chief of

Staff to the Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral Leahy soon became de

6

facto chairman of the Chiefs, being the liaison
between the

President and the Chiefs and presiding over the
JCS meetings.

The

JCS became the central directorate
of American military strategy and

operations during the war

.

See charts one and two of the JCS during

the war in the appendix. (6)
In

19^7, the National Security Act,

formally.

The NSA of

(NSA), created the JCS

maintained the members of the JCS.

The

creation of the NSC and the CIA removed some of JCS's functions.
The Secretary of Defense as head of the National Military

Establishment gave the JCS an additional civilian overhead. (7)
Figures one and two of the appendix illustrate the components of the
National Military Establishment.
a

Thomas Etzold uses the figures in

short essay on the National Military Establishment.

They are one

of the best illustrations of the interrelationship of the components

of the Military Establishment. (8)
The revision of the 19^7 act in 19^9, Public Law 216, created

Department of Defense in which the JCS was placed.
chairman became the de jure chairman.

The de facto

The chairman was as before to

preside over the JCS meetings, but had no vote.

chairman was allowed to vote.

a

In

1958, the

See charts three and four in the

appendix for the organizational development of the JCS in 19^7 snd
19^9. (9)

Today there are five permanent members; the Commandant of the

7

Marine Corps became full member in
1978 after having been authorized
to vote on matters of direct concern
to the Marines since 1952.(10)

The Organization of the JCS.

(OJCS)

is divided into two parts,

the Joint Staff and the JCS staff
organization, whose total is about

two thousand military and civilian
personnel.

headed by

a

The Joint Staff is

Director who is appointed by the JCS.(II)

The size of the Joint Staff has also undergone
several changes

since the

19^17

ceiling of 100 officers, proportionally taken
from

the three services.

In

1958 to a ceiling of

^400

19^49

the size was increased to 210 and since

officers.

In practice around 700 officers

are today controlled by the JCS, because officers can
be assigned to
the Organization of the Joint Staff. (12)

functions of the JCS The discrepancy between the formal and the
real function can hardly be any greater than in the case of the JCS.

The NSA established the JCS as the ’’principal military adviser”; in

reality the JCS role is by some called ceremonial.
The JCS was assigned the functions of (a)advising,

(b)planning

and to (c) assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in

their roles as military commanders.
First, the JCS became the principal military advisers to the

President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress.
JCS has direct access to all of these.

The

For instance, the JCS, by

3

.

8

tradition, has

individually on
Chairman is

a

prerogative to see the President as

a

a

matter of their concern.

a

group or

Furthermore, the

permanent member of the NSC and its permanent
staff

committees
Second, the JCS was put in charge of military
planning.

The JCS

is supposed to provide strategic and
logistic plans and give

guidance for the development of the defense
budget.

Moreover, the

JCS must review the plans, programs and
the requirements of the

seperate services.
Third, the JCS was to assist the President and the Secretary
of

Defense in exercising their command responsabilities.
The reality of the JCS role is very different.

( 1

)

First, the JCS

lawful obligation to provide military advice to the key executive

actors is not reciprocated by any obligation of the letters' part to
take it.

As a matter of fact, the role of the military advisers

depends on the individual administration.

Each President can choose

his own policy in this respect and has done so; the JCS has had to

adapt to each President
in

.

(1 4)

The President only rarely sees the JCS;

fact its advice is provided via the Secretary of Defense who sees

the President frequently, i.e, several times

a

membership does not guarantee influence.

depends on the

President's use of the NSC.

It

week. (15) The NSC

For example, Truman did not use the NSC

very much to solve any of the first cold war problems and Kennedy

9

and Johnson neglected the NSC in the
making of foreign policy. (16)
In

fact, according to Korb, the President's
relationship to the

military advisers is similar to the relationship
to his diplomatic
advisers in the State Department.

He mentions that the

relationships to Truman and Eisenhower of Chairmen
Bradley and
Radford were almost as close as their relationships
to the

Secretaries of State Acheson and Foster Dulles.
(1?)
Second, the planning function of the JCS is limited because

civilian leaders often consider the JCS plans as unrealistic.
plans are prepared by the Joint Staff, which is built upon

committee structure.

The

a

Each service has assigned officers to press

their views starting at

a

low level of the organization.

Coordination is interpretated by the services as ability to comment
as well as to get to answer that all services agree upon.

of that there is
rather than

a

a

tendency to agree upon

a

Pecause

high common denominator

lower estimate of needed capacities.

Third, the JCS is supposed to help the President and the

Secretary of Defense in exercising their command functions.
is some confusion about this point.

forces under their control.

command.

There

The Chiefs do not have any

The JCS is excluded from the chain of

There is no legal obligation for the President and the

Secretary of Defense to consult or to inform the JCS of decisions on
operational matters.

However, the Joint Chiefs seem to get involved

10

when armed conflict occurs, and are usually held
responsible for the

consequences of operational decisions .(

1

did command operating forces until 1953.

8

)

The members of the JCS
Then President Eisenhower

announced that the Chiefs were going to devote themselves to

planning and advising .( 9) Since 1958, when the Service Secretaries
1

were removed from the command, the chain of command for military

operations goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to
the four-star or five-star commanders, and from them to the

operation units of the armed forces. (20) Contrary to what is

commonly believed the JCS is not in the chain of operational command
between the Secretary of Defense and the field commanders. (21
JCS cannot command.

transmit commands.

The JCS is

1903 to

V/W

II,

staff organization.

The

They can only

"The Joint Chiefs cannot command anybody, unless

they're lucky enough to have
In short,

a

)

a

stenographer

." (22)

the JCS organizational history from the Joint Board of
and the JCS of 19^7 to the present day has followed

a

common pattern of development in two important respects: (a) its

creation was rooted in

a

need for coordination of the armed forces

due to an vastly expansion of American committments and (b) both the

Joint Board and the JCS peacetime role have declined over time.
Since 1953 the JCS is formally the US principal military

advisors of the US government.
Chiefs.

The members of the JCS are not truly

The planning becomes unrealistic thanks to the committee

structure of the planning groups within the Staff.

The JCS is

a

staff. The agency does not have any command functions,
it seems to
get the blame.

The Role of the JCS.

The lack of attention on the JCS does not reflect

a

consensus

about the role that the military men and military considerations

were playing in the process of defense decision making, nor is it

a

sign of common satisfaction with that role.

There are three distinct views on the role of the military in

defense policy: (1)the role is too great, (2) the role is
appropriate, (3)the role is too little.

The ’Excessive Influential* V iew.

The first view is shared by

a

group of observers that maintains that military demand and

considerations and military men play too great
of defense decision making.
in danger of

'militarism*.

part in the process

They believe in fact that the U.f.

is

Approaching the subject matter very

differently scholars like Harold
Cook, John

a

D.

Laswell, C.VYight Hills, Fred

Swomley and Julius Duscha belong to this group. (2?)

Among many others that belong to it, it is worth mentioning Admiral

12

David Shoup,
and

a

former Commandant of the Marine Corps,

I960 to 1963,

journalist, Tristram Coffin. (2^0

a

The view has furthermore been voiced in public reports
like the

Hoover Commission and the Rockefeller Committee
(25) It was
.

indicated by

a

President with high military prestige who in his

Farewell Address warned against future dangers of
unwarranted

influence by

a

military-industrial complex, (26)

Ten years after President Eisenhower's famous warning against
the military-industrial complex, Adam Yarmol insky

,

a

former Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,

concludes

a

comprehensive study of the social impacts of the

military establishment by expressing
observers

The

'

in

a

view similar to one held by

this group. (27)

Appropriately Influential

*

View.

The second view is held by

people that think that the military considerations and military men
did not exceed the proper role despite the size of the American

Post-WW II military complex and the complexity of military policy.
Samual Huntington and Morris Janowitz are the most prominent

scholars sharing this view. (28) To this group belongs furthermore
General James Gavin who believes that civilian attitudes and

influence prevail as well as the foreign policy expert B.M.
Sapin (29)
.

(

.

1
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Ihe ^Insufficiently Influential* View.

A third

view was born when

Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense and introduced
new

working methods within the Department of Defense.

This group of

observers thinks that the JCS's influencee in defense decision
making is too little, i.e., that the executive, by bypassing the
JCS
on too many occations and sometimes even dictating military
planning

prevents the JCS from performing properly the role as military

advisers
A

few scholars express this view, e.g., John Ries.( 30 ) The group

consists mostly of retired military professionals and former defense

officials such as former Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr
CNO,

1953 - 1957,

Admiral Nathan F.

for the Air Force,
CNO,

1961

- 1963.

1961

- 1965

,

Colonel William A.

former

Twining, former Chief of Staff

General Curtis E.

Admiral George W.

,

Anderson .( 3

LeMay and former
)

Lieutenant

Hamilton III argues that the civilian leadership

during the Kennedy-Johnson era was marked by prejudices regarding
the military. (32) Major Lawrence B.

Tatum, however, stresses

erronous assumptions held by the military organizations as the cause
for the minor role of the JCS in strategy-making

journalists like Clark

R.

a

33 ) Prominent

Mollenhoff, and Hanson Baldwin from the

New York Times express this concern.

experience as

.(

3 ^)

Hanson Balwin had an

higly placed staff member during the

Staff organization.

WTJ

II Joint

Recently, this group was joined by some
observers expressing
similar views regarding the JCS.
»

George

C

A senior writer

Wilson, called the JCS

"bothersome board of directors. "(35)
Kester

,

military

analyzes the role of the JCS.
s

a

A

for the Washington

"ceremonial body,"

a

former defense official, John
He concludes that the

role previously had been too little in shaping national

security policy. (36)

A

Critique of the Literature on the Military Pole.

A

critique of

the literature that has been mentioned up to this point is that the

understanding of the military role is constrained, because the
approach was either too narrowly focused, analyzing

a

specific case

or events of a shorter period of time, or it was too broadly based,

analyzing too many phases and actors to rely on enough information
on one. (37)
It would be

appropriate to add that the question of measurement

and specific role of the military had been avoided in the debate,

Korb included.

The complex composition of the American military

advice which crosses the lines of the professional military and the

civilian administrators and experts for research institutions and

universities makes the avoidance understandable, yet not excusable.
What does influence mean?

And who is influenced by whom?

overall evaluation of the influence has little meaning.

The

15

Furthermore, there is little meaning in comparing
the peacetime
role with the JCS role during WW II, as
Huntington does.

It

makes

very little sense, too, to compare the
postwar role with the pre-V/W
II role,

because of the fundamentally different international

structure and climate, and the role of the US in
international
politics.
Moreover, it is only within

intelligible to deal with
military.
role.

a

a

normative framework that it is

notion of an appropriate role of the

This assumes that there is some kind of ideal type of

An examination of many books, reports, and articles on this

subject reveals that there is very little agreement as to what this
ideal should be apart from the tacit assumption of constitutional

norms of civilian supremacy as

a

given.

The only way to understand

the criticism that respective authors have on the role of the

military is by understanding the tacit normative ideal the authors
entertain for the military .(38)

The Thesis.

The substance of American foreign policy after WW II was

radically different from that before the war.
largely upon

a

Having been based

legalistic and idealistic outlook of the world of

16

international politics, post-W II foreign policy became
based upon
’realist’

premises.

A

geopolitical,

’realist’ outlook which

normally is ascribed to military thinking.

It could easily have

assumed that the military was influential in the transformation.
The difference between thinking of international politics in

moralistic terms and the thinking of international relations in
pragmatic terms is so radical that it is reasonable to assume that
the military that is characterized by the latter type of thinking

did have a substantial role.
The assumption is furthermore strengthened by the high public

prestige that WW II military heroes enjoyed amongst both the

Washington community and the public at large.
The influence is further detected by the fact that since

substantial military forces have been considered necessary for
valid foreign policy.

II,

klJ

a

About loX of the GNP annually has been

devoted to military purposes.

The Mil itar y Role in American Foreign Policy.

It

is a matter of

evidence that the American military men and military considerations
have played an unprecedented part in American foreign policy.

my thesis, however, that if it makes sense to make

a

It

distinction

between professional military advisers and civilian advisers, the
top military advisers of the JCS have had
in

foreign policy after

WV/

11.(39)

a

largely overrated role

is

17

On matter of military expertise, the
influence amounted to what

civilian leaders and institutions would allow.

considerations have

a

Military

high position and one prominent American

historian today maintains that the American government
must work
within the framework prescribed by the military
.(40)
In foreign policy matters it seems to me that the
distinction

between civil and military expertise has become blurred.

The

civilian element har become militarized and the military element has
become politicized.

Diplomatic specialists have become military

generalists, while military experts have become political
generalists.

It is more reasonable to argue that this blurring is

the trend than to argue that the development of the civil-military

relationship has been characterized by an increase in influence of
formal military institutions and of military professionals. (41)

The JCS perception of the external threat, of the intentions of
the major opponents, was largely shared by the top-civilian

administrators in terms of values, social causality, etc.

V/hile

there was agreement that the threat was real and where it came from,

there was disagreement about what to do about it.

Ironically, in

matters of political and military analysis, where the military
advice competes with the advice of the diplomatic specialists, the

military view tended to prevail, whereas in areas of strategic
planning use of force in crisis, weapon procurement, the military
specialists’ view was not as influential as initially expected.

(

)

)

18

Domestic Reasons for the Minor Role of

^

JCS.

The domestic

components of the complex of reasons for the lack of
military
influence will be tentatively indicated.
The military specialists do not have the exclusive
competence in

respect to military matters of the peacetime battlefield.

objective of the military shifted from the effort to win

The
a

war, the

next war, to the effort win the peace, i.e., maintain peace.

traditional strategy of mobilization changed to

deterrence

.

a

The

strategy of

H2)

During WW II, the the Joint Chiefs were the military advisors to
the President, - the Commander in Chief, - regarding the strategic

direction of the US forces in wartime for which purpose

a

closed

staff system was created.

The JCS organization became independent

of all but the President.

This is crucial; it has been argued

convincingly that the JCS role during the war has been somewhat
exaggerated, referring to the fact that on several occasions the

President's view prevailed when the Chiefs were in disagreement with
him in cases such as the desirability of the invasion of Africa,

"Operation Torch. "( 143 ) There is

a

difference to the state that Fleet

Admiral Leahy perceives when he said in 19^5: "The JCS at the

present time are under no civilian control whatever"

(

Huntington

approvingly uses this quote as evidence for the apogee of the JCS
influence

. (

45

19

When time came after the end of the war to
integrate the

military advice in government, the MSA formalized
the status and the
functions of the JCS.

This political construction did not have the

same creativity and constitutional innovation
as the T.V.A.

system

of the 193o's.(iJ6) The committee structure
of the JCS organization
was not only

a

system of checks and balances between the military

services themselves, but the new National Military Establishment
also reinforced

a

civilian control by placing the JCS within

a

relationship of immediate subordination to the Secretary of Defense.
A stronger institutional

position was further constrained by

a

long American tradition of anti-militarism, which was rooted in the

pre-Revolution experiences with the British occupational forces as
well as the experience of many of the 19th century immigrants, many

of whom had come here to avoid the long service in the European

armies. (^7) This traditional attitude is very strong.

It

explains

the apparent contradication between the public hostility to arms

manufacturer of the inter-war years and the strong and still present
defense of the ’right* of civilians to bear arms.

It

makes it

easier to understand the paradox between American attitudes towards
’civil’ weapons and ’military’ weapons.

Furthermore,

a

stronger institutional position of the military

was constrained by the fear of the German General Staff. (48) It is

worth mentioning that

a

common belief at the time was that the

.

20

German Military Staff had been
V/W

I

a

strong factor for the outbreak of

prejudiced any counterpart in American government.

It was

widely believed that Japanese men had caused the
Japanese

aggressions of the 1930's.(49)
Regarding the JCS perception of the postwar period, the

experience of WW II is the most powerful factor determining the
perception.

The significant impact of

WV/

II

experience is found in

the believed (a)need for force to pursue foreign policy, (b)danger

of appeasement in diplomacy and (c)danger of aggression in world
pol itics

The Focus of the Thesis.

Any final analysis on the military influence entails an

extensive study of the views of other key domestic actors in U.S.
foreign policy to satisfy the needs of sufficient material for

comparison, but it exceeds the scope of

a

Master’s Thesis.

Here

focus is on one dimension.
The stereotypes on the role of the military in politics and the

lack of studies makes it relevant to focus on the JCS role, not in

terms of influence, but in terms of understanding of their

perspective.

The JCS can boast of com.ing to

a

clear attitude about
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the Soviet postwar intentions and the role
of the US in that respect
- earlier

than most institutions involved in foreign policy
during

the formative years of the cold war.
in overt influence.

It was

unnecessary to engage

The military's point of view became the

prevailing point of view amongst civilians or non-defense
officials.
And that constituted their influence.

The JCS's perception of Uie external threat.

more plausible

A

approach to the understanding of the JCS role in the cold war is to
link the JCS perceptions of the external threat to JCS proposals of
national defense.

In other words, we will analyze the JCS reports

in terms of their

interpretation of Soviet intentions and of Soviet

arms and other capabilities - an "explication de texte" - rather
than through an objective approach analyzing the JCS role in terms

of function of coordinator of forces and vested interests.
the JCS see?

V/hat

did the JCS propose?

V^hat

did

What changes were there in

the JCS perception and what were the consequences for the JCS

proposals?
Concerning the concept of perception, John Stoessinger suggests
the use of four analytical categories:

(a)national self-image, which

concerns the question of who the national leaders think they are and
what role they view their nation should have,

(

b)

perception of

intentions which regards the problem of how national leaders view
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another nation's intentions toward itself,

capabilities and power -

a

(

c)

perception of

category dealing with mil itary .industrial

and human resources in terms of present
and future numbers and

skills, and (d)perception of the character of the
opponent that

deals with the view of the nature of the adversary
(50)
.

For this paper, Stoessinger s categories of intentions
and
'

capabilities of the opponent and national self-image constitute
point of departure.

a

They have been used as analytical devices in

understanding the JCS's perception of the external threat as
manifested in military and diplomatic documents.
The military uses the terms of intentions and capabilities both
in a narrow military sense and in

a

way indicating the broader

meaning, which includes diplomatic and other non-military dimensions
as well.

When the narrow meaning is referred to, it will be

specified in this paper.

,

.

s

:
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Chiefs of Staff, 1979.

(7) Sections 201

to 214 of Public Law 253i (NSA), describe the
functions of the components of the National Military Establishment.
)
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CHAPTER

II

WHO IS THE NEW ENEMY

?

The Cold War and the Military.

Who

the new Enemy?

Scholars continue to disagree about the

origins of the cold war.

Traditionalists - as the official wisdom

of the time indicates - are still in no doubt about the
course of
the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States
emerging

after WW II.

Revisionists blame the US for having caused the cold

war or prompted it for reasons of economic gain.

Regarding any conflict there usually are conflicting

interpretations.

Revisionist interpretations have challenged

conventional explanations after each war the US has participated in.
This is not an exclusive American phenomenon.

What the cold war was

and what the reason for it was, seeems to depend on the definitions

of the cold war as well as the predominant values enthroned by the

particular scholar.

Whatever reason and label, the common cause for the Grand
Alliance between the Big Three, US, UK and USSR, disappeared during
1945.

Tension characterized the relationship between the US and the

USSR on the diplomatic level as well as on the military level.
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On

)
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the diplomatic level the issues of
conflict were the future of

Poland, the UN, and Germany.

On the military level the freeing of

prisoners of war, the cooperation in the war
effort against Germany,
and the occupation of East European
countries caused considerable

frictions.

( 1

Few revisionists have dealt with the role of the
defense

leadership.

When it is dealt with, the influence of the defense

leadership is either exaggerated or disparaged . (2)
The military leaders and civilians urged constant vigilance

against surprise attach.

One historian, Michael Sherry, calls these

collective plans and perceptions "the ideology of national
preparedness”, which, he argues, became an important component of
postwar policy and as such encouraged Americans to define the Soviet
Union as the nation's next enemy. (3)
Cold war rhetoric contained to

a

large degree perceptions,

images and the traumatic experiences of the 1930’s and the 19^40's.
For an institution such as the military where tradition plays a

predominant role, the sense of time and the view of the past becomes
important, which is

a

reason by itself for studying how the

historical experience influenced the military's view on postwar
world politics.

The organizational interests cannot alone provide

full explanation for a given perception at

a

given time.

The "preparedness ideology" thesis is supported by Daniel

a
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Yergin's hypothesis that the national security is
a

perception - which was

manifestation of

a

a

a

state of mind -

response to past experience as well as

a

common understanding of the conditions for

general war and practice. (4)
The same scholar argues, in fact, that organizational
interests

were another source of the military's exaggerated perception
of the

Soviet intentions and capabilities, i.e., the need of the armed
forces to make the American position credible. (5)

Another scholar,

a

political scientist, R.K.

Betts, rejects the

claim that bellicose generals - an attitute steoreotypically

attributed to military men - prompted the cold war by seeking

conflicts with the Soviets, (6) His study of cold war crises shows
that there is little evidence of consistent differences - in terms

of "aggressiveness", i.e., willingness of recommending use of force
as a means to resolve a given crisis - in the recommendations of

soldiers and statesmen . (7 ) Against Betts' conclusions three

objections can be raised: first, the cold war crises from the Berlin
Blockade in 1948 to the Christmas Bombing of Hanoi of 1972 are the
evidence for Betts' interpretation (8) his results may however
;

derive from conditions especially unique for crisis decisions; does
the focus of the crises provide enough information to understand the

general character of the attitudes?

Would such information provide

enhanced understanding of these crises?

I

think so.

A second
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objection is that defense officials do have

supporting them, the Pentagon.

a

unique institution

And third, non-defense officials

concerned with foreign policy were conditioned by the
cold war to
think in perspectives often attributed only
to military men. (9)
It would thus be interesting to investigate
the military

advisers’ attitudes and perceptions regarding the external
threat to
the USA.

Do secret and top secret documents of the time reveal
any

different perception from the already known anxiety?
would it thus be an indication of an attempt to create

If there is,
a

public mood

in favor of military spending and establishment and
maintenance of a

large standing army?

Another vital aspect of the study is the

evidence the military have for aggressive Soviet intentions.
The questions that this study adresses itself to are (a)what did
the military advisers, the JCS, believe the Soviets were up to,

i.e., what did the JCS expect to happen regarding the Soviet Union,
and what did the JCS think the Soviets could do, and (b)what were

the reasons for this perception?
1

Instead of asking whether a bellicose attitude of military men

prompted the cold war, we will ask whether the alarmist perception
of defense officials regarding Soviet intentions and capabilties

prompted the cold war.

A first step towards an answer would be to

detect whether the alarmist perception differ consistently between

defense and non-defense officials.

In sum, this paper will deal with the
JCS role in US national

policy in terms of the JCS perception of the
Soviet intentions and

capabilities during the first years of the cold war
emphasizing the
(2)

years 19^16.948 and 1950.

The focus will be on:

(3)
(Dwhat
were the JCS perceptions of the Soviet intentions?

(4)

what were the JCS perceptions of Soviet military and economic

capabilities?
what was the JCS perception of US intentions and

capabilities?
which sources for the perception are indicated in the JCS

documents and other documents for evidence for (a)historical
experience, (b)WW II, (c)organizational interests, the inter-service

rivalry (d)role of nuclear weapons and (e)conflict over strategy.

The Setting

The Postwar International System.

USSR and the US emerged in

a

1

946.

At the conclusion of WW II, the

class by themselves.

The postwar

international system became characterized by the conflict between
these two superpowers in all dimensions of the system.

The Inter-State Relations.

WW II brought

a

radical change in the US

foreign and military policy as well as her relationship to the USSR.
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In American policy, collective
security and preparedness replaced

isolation and disarmament as US principles for
preventing war.

Collaboration with allies during the war developed
into

participation in the United Nations; Lend-Lease
Aid to the Allies
developed later into the Marshall Plan and
economic aid to friendly
and neutral countries.
The relationship to the USSR changed from
difficult

collaboration to

relationship of confrontation regarding major

a

issues in world politics.

The JCS Perception of Soviet Intentions.

The Early JCS Perception of

External Postwar Threat.

contours of world politics did not come as
American military advisers in the JCS.

a

A JCS

The new

surprise for the

report to the State

Department in 19M4 had forecast the new world conditions.

Likewise,

forecast was an increasing degree of tensions between the USSR and
the US as the common goal for the war-effort became less

meaningful

. (

10)

From early 19^5,

a

series of intelligence reports were made in

order to estimate Soviet postwar intentions and capabilities.

The

«

JCS was warned about dangers of misperception and miscalculation:

"With the history of foreign

s

upon the USSR and the legacy of
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the Marxian ideology, the Soviet leaders
will probably overemphasize

any British or American expansionist tendencies
and exaggerate the

possibility of aggression against the USSR from any quartered

1)

The reasoning behind the JCS's refusal to
approve any of General

Deane and Harriman's proposals from the US Embassy in
Moscow shows
that the JCS took the JIC warning of counterproductive effects

seriously. (12)
It is important to note that the JCS seems cautious regarding

the perception of the Soviet Union during this first period of the

postwar era.

Despite a considerable number of intelligence reports

there is no JCS decision concerning the postwar threat to the US,

before a report was requested.

February 19^6.

February 1946 is

a

turning point in the

perception of the Soviet intentions amongst American governmental
officials.

According to Samuel Huntington, the London Conference in

the fall of 1945 was a turning point in the relationship between the

USSR and the US, because for the first time

a

stalemated "London

Council of Foreign Ministers” adjourned without issuing

protocol

.(

1

3)

a

The breakdown of the conference is reflected in the

JIC and JSSC reports of the fall of 1945.

They are more pessimistic

regarding the prospects for diplomatic solutions of the problems by
showing

a

growing dismay over Soviet foreign policy. (14) The JCS

asked its planners, JSP, to study areas in which the US could stop
an attempted Soviet aggression

.(

15)

At any rate, only after a series of
reports from the strategic

and intelligence committees of the JCS
organization, the JCS

cautiously decided upon an evaluation of the
external dangers to
peace and to the US, when they were requested to
make comments from
the military perspective on the State Department
paper of December
19^5 dealing with the postwar foreign policy of the
US. (16)

The JCS word was forwarded to the SWNCC on February
21.

The

State Department received Kennan's "Long Telegram" the next
day,

which turned out to become one of the single most influential
papers
within the government explaining Soviet behavior.

Telegram no.

511

from George Frost Kennan, charge d'affaires at the American
Embassy
in Moscow, contained
a 8,000 word long analysis of the sources of

Soviet behavior as well as some proposals
for US countermeasures.

A

traditional Russian feeling of insecurity, according to Kennan,

determined the Soviet outlook on world affairs.

The Marxist

ideology provided strong hostility against capitalism.

The two

sources produced an uncompromising attitude in world affairs and an

open-ended need for security.

It could be dealt with by a united

Western world, which had become morally and economically strong
after the US had taken the responsability.

Force was

a

key element.

The Soviets did not understand the logic of reason, but were

sensitive to the logic of force. (17)
During the war the JCS was reluctant to spell out its perception
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of Soviet postwar intentions.

The JCS now perceived the

consolidation and the development of Russian power
as the greatest
danger to the US.

It posed an indirect threat, however, because
the

danger for the US was to become involved in

expansionist Soviet Union and

a

clash between an

a

still grasping Great Britain.

Concerning the JCS perception of the political role
of the US,
the JCS did not state that the US should become a
mediator between
the USSR and Great Britain, as they had done during the war
to help

minimize the chances for an expected clash.

If anything, the US

should rather support, through economic means, nations that were

endangered by Soviet expansion.

Collaboration with the Soviet Union

was still perceived as possible, i.e.,

a

tacit indication that the

conflicts were not considered as unresol vable.

There should, on the

other hand, be no compromise of principle regarding further Russian

influence in the Europe and the Far East.
Regarding the role of the UN, the JCS did not regard the

organization as an effective prevention of war, because of
power and procedure to settle major conflicts.
a

a

lack of

In order to prevent

war, the US should instead have the ability to back its policy

with force.

The JCS began to think in terms of the lack of

preparedness in case of

a

general war, as well as the credibility of

an opposing attitude vis-a-vis an only partly demobilized Soviet

Union.

Being the strongest military power potentially, the time for

)
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a

general mobilization would not be long enough
in case of

attack, because the geographical isolation was
no longer

a

a

sudden

factor

nor was the Allies’ ability to hold potential
enemies at bay long

enough.

In general,

government take

a

the JCS recommended that the American

firm and friendly attitude towards the
Russians,

but emphasizing the firmness. ( 18)
In short, the JCS overall image of the Soviet Union
was mixed.

The Soviet Union was an expansionist power, but it was
Russian not

communist expansion.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning

that up to this point the JCS perception on the institutional level
did not reveal alarm, but rather concern over the prospects of

having to confront the Soviet Union in conflicts ahead.

In fact the

real concern seems to have been the US's own military capabilities

due to the rapid demobilization that was taking place, at

a

rate

that exceeded the military plans made during the war. (19)
The Clifford Report.

In July,

Clark M.

Clifford, Special

Counsel to the President, requested JCS recommendations based on

Soviet activities that had affected American security (20) The
.

request came as

a

convenient opportunity for the JCS to express its

concern with which it had watched the growing Soviet expansiveness
since the Japanese surrender . (21
The Clifford report is significant in more than one respect. (22)

Although it was never circulated outside the White House, it is the
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first government paper which sought
the Russians.

a

comprehensive policy regarding

It was edited by Clifford and George Elsey,
a White

House administrative assistant, who based their paper on
reports
from several agencies including the Departments
of State, War Navy,
the JCS, the Attorney General and the Director of
Central

Intelligence.

Secondly, it contained all the major elements of what

later would become the containment policy under the label of
the

Truman Doctrine.

Furthermore, the report revealed

a

sense of alarm.

When the report was handed to the President in the late summer,
Truman read the report overnight and first thing the next morning

ordered the remaining copies be placed in his safe; leaks would

damage efforts to improve the relationship with the Russians, he
said according to daughter Margaret . (23)

According to the JCS historians, the final report was basically
the JCS report sent to Clifford, which he slightly edited, assisted
by Elsey,

The report can thus be taken as an accurate reflection of

the JCS stand on the issue at the time.
The goal of Soviet foreign policy was now seen as endless

expansion, i.e., world domination.

War would be inevitable, since

the Soviets viewed peaceful coexistance in the long run as

impossible.

The report says bluntly that the Soviet Union was

engaged in aggressive militaristic imperialism, preparing the best

possible position for the inevitable conflict.

As a matter of fact.

.

.
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the Soviet Union would use every means short of
war to obtain her

objectives, i.e., subjugate satellites, control strategic
areas,
isolate and weaken '•capitalist" nations militarily,
thwarting every
US effort to secure peace settlement, keeping
"excessively large"

forces in occupied areas - the forces in Eastern Europe
deployed

offensively against attack on Western Europe or Turkey.

According

to the report, the Soviet undertook frantic efforts to overcome
the

US lead in military technology; it was furthermore creating economic

dependency

in areas under its influence, by

reparations.

demanding exorbitant

On top of all this, the Soviet Union was said to be

using religious groups in the Middle East, and the communist party
in the US, by encouring strikes, espionage and violent propaganda

attacks
The Soviet military policy sought to erect a perimeter of client

states and trusteeships around themselves.

military domination east of

a

In addition to the

"Stettin-Trieste" line, the Soviet

Union sought to draw all of Germany and Austria into the sphere of

influence, frustrating the formation of any West European bloc.

In

Greece, Turkey and Iran "friendly" governments should be in place;
in the Far East the Soviets would try to neutralize China, Korea and

Japan
The JCS proposed that the US should create strong military

forces, because that would be the only sure guarantee for peace.

In
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fact the US should try to restrain the
Soviet influence, and should

accord generous economic assistance
and political support to all

nations not within the Soviet sphere, (24)
The JCS had a dominant role in the drafting
of an

interdepartmental definition of the containment policy.

Compared to

the previous JCS perception of Soviet intentions,
the JCS had gone

from

a

moderately concerned perception during the war, to

a

concerned attitude during the first postwar months, to an
alarmist

perception during the sumramer of 1946.(25)
The JCS perception seemed to focus on Soviet intentions rather
than an estimate of Soviet military and economic capabilities; i.e.,
the focus on what they feared the Soviets would do rather than what
the JCS thought the Soviets could do.

An example are the various

plans that the JCS estimated would be applied for

a

possible Soviet

invasion of Italy and Spain.

Why did the JCS change its perception from being concerned
during the winter of 1945-46 to becoming alarmed by the Soviet
foreign policy during the summer of 1946?

Soviet Union as

a

From perceiving the

Russian expansionism, the JCS saw now an aggresive

Soviet imperialism. (26) (27)

The JCS Comments on Soviet Demands on Turkey.

The Soviet demands on

Turkey during 1945 and those made in 1946 created

a

different

response by the JCS, and provide

a

good case of detecting the

dif*f6rence in reasoning regarding the Soviet motives.
TTie

Soviet Demands £n

Dardanelles.

For the preparation of

the Potsdam Conference, the JCS had been requested
to provide

military comments on the Soviet
demands on the Straits.

Two papers

were prepared by members of the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee,
(JSSC); Major General Fairchild and Lieutenant General Embick
made

one and Vice Admiral Willson made the other.

The two papers had

almost similar conclusions but different premises regarding the

appraisal of Sovet motives.
The disapproved majority, Fairchild and Embick, argued that the

demands on the Dardanelles should be seen as
Russian historical aspirations.

justification.

continuation of

a

The motives had thus

The Mediterranean was no longer

a

a

moral

British lake, said

Embick and Fairchild, regarding the effects on the position of Great
Britain which had had these ambitions in the past.

of the JSSC said moreover that avoidance of
needed in order to preserve peace.

a

The two members

UK-USSR conflict was

This argument to preserve peace

was similar to the one the JCS made in 19^^. (28) Finally, the

majority paper questioned how the US could oppose the Soviet
demands, when US wanted bases in Iceland, in the Pacific and the
Azores. (29)
The approved minority opinion, - provided by Vice Admiral

)

Russell Willson, - argued, in contrast to earlier
JCS endeavors for

consensus in order to maintain

a

united war effort, that the US

could oppose such demands, because the Soviet Union
economic

capabilities after the war, the poor state of which made the
Soviets
need American assistance and support to reestablish the
economy.

Furthermore, the demands on Turkey, like those on Bear Island and

Stitzbergen were demands of

a

different nature than those previously

made, because the Soviet Union could not back up the new ones with
force, i.e., they were outside the occupied areas. (30)
It was estimated that the US and Great Britain could oppose

successfully Russian effort to seize the areas by force.

However,

the Russian effort would decline the more distant the demanded area.
It was the new nature of the demand as well as the stated Russian

interest in preventing a break with the US, because of the need for
US capital and other economic support and the declining rate by

which the Soviets could back their demand, that formed the premises
for the JCS proposal to Truman at Potsdam.

The proposal was to

defer any final decision or, if that were not feasible, to support

demilitarization of the Straits, but to oppose bestowal of base
rights upon any foreign power.

At the JCS meeting Admiral Leahy

reported that the State Department supported the idea that the

Straits should become

a

free waterway.

The JCS approved Willson’s

minority paper and sent it to the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee

. (
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(

.

(
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Retrocession of

and Ardahan.

In the spring of 19H6,

the Soviet Union began making demands on
Turkey in addition to those
she had made in connection with the Dardanelles.

The Soviets asked

Turkey to retrocede the Kars - Ardahan region
which were two
provinces bordering the the Soviet Union.

Turkey and the Soviet Union placed

a

The demand was refused by

considerable contingent of

troops on the border. 32 )

Having been requested to give military comments on the

implications of the Soviets demands,
the JCS memo to the State

Department stated that the demands were

a

clear manifestation of the

Soviet desire to dominate the Middle East and the Eastern

Meditararnean

.

33 )

As for the demands of the bases near the Dardanelles, the Soviet

Union had no legitimate need for these bases in either peace or war;
in case of war, she could close the Straits without these bases,

i.e., the bases would not improve the military position of the

Soviet Union.
attitude.

The demands were therefore not
based upon

a

defensive

They indicated an intention to establish exclusive

control over the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf.

Accepting these

demands would lead to others aimed at the control over the Aegean
area; agreement to the Soviet demands in this instance sets the

stage and furnishes the basis for further well-timed territorial

demands

According to the JCS, an acceptance of
the Soviet demands would
lead to consequences which we can categorize
as follows: (a)

threaten the British Empire as the last bulwark
between US and
Soviet expansion, (b)undermine nations' confidence
in the UN,

(c)appeasement in the current view would inevitably lead to
war,

according to the popular view of the early post WW II era.
"Public opinion against and repugnance to such

a

policy have led

us into two wars in the last thirty years against those who
held to

the principle of "Might Makes Right. "(34)

The Perception of Soviet Intentions by Key Individuals.

Up to this point we have only dealt with the perception of the

Soviet intentions after the war, as these were seen through

institutional papers, especially the JCS.

The JCS consists of the

three services, which may have different functions in the war,

different experience during the past war and different

organizational interests, which may lead them to
perception of the Soviet threat.

a

different

According to Jervis it is

difficult to separate interests from perception. (35) From the

objective perspective, one can ask whether the military with vested
interests in peacetime preparedness was detecting Soviet intentions
as expansionist earlier than other foreign policy actors.

.
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We will look at the degree of concern
with which key officials

expressed or are said to have expressed concern
about the Soviet
postwar intentions and to what degree this concern
was expressed.
We will examine whether they were alarmed,
deeply concerned,

moderately concerned, or were indifferent to the
Soviet intentions.
This study is largely based upon secondary literature.
During
on

vrtiat

War

During the war, the military
lacked

a

consensus

threat the Soviet ally posed. (36) Army planners identified

no specific enemy in the planning.

Unlike the Army Air Force and

the Navy, the Army planners thought the U.S.

sny side.

could be attacked from

Despite that the Red Army was the most obvious threat to

American security interests; army planners did not agree with the

distrust of the Russians that shared by the Army Air Force and the
Navy. (37)

Among military junior officers, there was also

perception than the official JCS view.
professional military journals in

a

a

different

Such concern is reflected in

debate concerning the cause of

WW II and the possibilities of avoiding similar mistakes in the

postwar era, (38) First lieutenant Riley Sunderland expressed one
such view.

He makes a correlation between surprise attacks and

totalitarian regimes, because of their semimobilization in
peacetime. (39)
At the end of the war, there was a considerable diversity in the
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views on Soviet intentions amongst key military
figures.

Secretary

of the Navy James Forrestal's alarmed view of the Soviet
intentions
is well known.

It is uncertain how far back Forrestal’s
Russophobia

dates. (40) There is no doubt of its early intensity.

initiated at the end of 1945

a

Forrestal

survey to determine whether Stalin

had a blueprint for world conquest similar to Hitler's Mein
Kampf.

After George Kennan's "Long Telegram," Forrestal became an

enthusiastic Kennan booster, despite that Kennan stressed that the
Soviet Union did not work by a fixed plan.

He played a central part

in getting an updated version published in Foreign Affairs which

became known as the "Mr.

"

X

article in 1947.

Perceiving the Russians at first hand, Forrestal had such
allies,

vrtio

distrusted Soviet behavior, as Ambassador Averell

Harriman and head of the Military Mission of the Embassy in Moscow,
General John Deane.

In Washington, the alarmed view was rare among

key officials of the government such as Assentant Secretary of War
John McCloy.(41) McCloy's chief. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson was

not alarmed but deeply concerned.

The alarmist view was expressed

by experts in the War Department who argued for "countermeasures in
the anticipation of another world war. "(42) Also staff in the

Department of State voiced

a

concerned view about Soviet intentions.

Secretary of State Stettinius was less concerned than his Russophobe
Under Secretary Joseph Grew.

But both argued for an unyielding
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stand against supposed Soviet expansion in
the late spring of

1945.(43)

The firm stand concerning Soviet penetration into
Western Europe
did not reflect a panic nor a clear idea of Soviet
intentions in the

top military command.
a

Admiral Leahy and General Arnold showed both

deep concern, whereas Admiral King did not express any
stand.

This was due to King's sharp distinction between military
and

political matters.

He regarded any views of Soviet postwar plans to

belong to political matters.

General Marshall's views on

Soviet-American relations were less precise than those of his
collagues.

Marshall saw little reason to distrust the Russians

arguing that the Soviet uncooperative behavior stemmed from

a

of maintaining security. (44) General Eisenhower expressed

similar

view.

a

need

But George Patton was deeply alarmed about the prospects of

dealing with

a

"scurvy race" of "Mongoloan Savages" every one of

them "an all out son of a bitch,

a

barbarian and

a

chronic drunk"

who would conspire with the Jews and others to communize Europe and

America. "(45) However, Patton was amuzing rather than persuasive

among colleagues.

The view expressed by Marshall and Eisenhower

prevailed amongst senior officers of the Army.
The perception of Soviet intentions during the war shows two

important characteristics, (a)a hardline alarmist view regarding
Soviet behavior towards world domination and

a

softline concerned
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view regarding Soviet behavior seen as motivated
by national
interests; these did not ssplit according to the defense
or

non-defense affiliation of the officials; and

(

b)

lower-ranking

officials in the staff, both in defense and non-defense,
seemed more
likely to take

a

hardline view than their chiefs.
»

After the war had ended this trend continued.

The number of deeply concerned as well as concerned officials grew.
As Soviet-American relations were disintegrating, military men

viewed events in the fall of 1945 as part of an alarming pattern.

Stalinist Russia appeared to more and more military men as an enemy
bent on world domination; in the services, this number grew in the

Navy and the Army Air Force more than in the Army.

Eisenhower was appointed Army Chief of Staff in November 1945.
He maintained his soft outlook.

Eisenhower argued in front of the

House Military Affairs Committee: "Russia has not the slightest

thing to gain by a struggle with the U.S.(46)

Kennan’s "Long Telegram" was widely destributed.

In addition to

James Forrestal's active promotion of the view, it was also promoted

by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Also Secretary of State

Byrnes liked it, as did Freeman Matthews, director of the Office of
Eurof>ean Affairs.

In fact,

it expressed what many already

believed . (47) But not all liked the Kennan view.
Clay was in sharp disagreement.

General Lucius

Also Clay's adviser in the State
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Department, Robert Murphy did not believe
in imminent Soviet
aggression. (H8) Yergin demonstrates however,
that Clay's view by
late spring of 19^6 had become an increasingly
lonely view.

Eisenhower continued to be relatively optimistic
about Soviet

intentions and skeptical about Soviet capabilities to
crush US
forces in Europe.

"I don't believe the Reds want war.

they gain now by armed conflict?

assimilate.

They need

a

They have gained what they can

strategic air arm and

Eisenhower to Truman during

a

What can

a

Navy," said

meeting in the White House in June

19^6.(49) This demontrates again that even when the JCS had

approached

a

deeply concerned outlook by the summer of

Chief of the Army still continued to be

a

softliner.

19^<6,

the

.
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CHAPTER

III

PLANNING FOR WAR

The Setting 1948.

International System

By 19^8, the trend that emerged from WW

II had continued to develop; the leading powers of the
former

Eurepean system were either defeated or economically and militarily

devastated.

The international system became increasingly

characterized by the US and the USSR as the major antagonists, who
each engineered

a

political alignment in the system.

This had

become clear when the British economic problems surfaced in 1947 - 48

The Inter-State Relation.

The period 1947-48 saw the final break in

the relations between the wartime allies.

manifested by the Truman Doctrine,

a

The political break was

political proclamation of

containment, and by the Russian refusal to accept the offer of
economic assistance from the Marshall Plan in June 19^8.

In 19^8

the coup in Prague and the Berlin Blockade sent shockwaves of war
fear throughout the world.

Previously undecided nations made up

their minds from which super power to seek protection in case of
war.

.

A few remained strictly neutral.
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The JCS Perception £f

TjTe

E ffects of

^

1
.

9^8 crises.

^

External Threat.

Only one government paper was

a

clear product of the crisis atmosphere
caused by the spring crisis
and the fear of war.(l) The NSC
7 was an attempt to raise an

argument for the need for an American
counteroffensive against
communism.

The hardline image of Soviet motives
continued.

The

parallel to Hitler'ss
achievements was indicated by the NSC 7's

reference to Stalin's policy saying
that Stalin had come close to
get what Hitler failed to
obtain. (2)

TT^ Prague Coup.

There is no sign that the Prague Coup caused

alarm at the JCS level.

Perhaps it was expected that the Soviet

Union would try to stabilize her position in Eastern Europe.
Several intelligence studies assumed that. (3) Or perhaps the Chiefs

were more occupied settling their own disputes over the wartime

functions of the three services. Herken makes this point, indicating
that the sense of emergency was not perceived as threatening enough
for the Chiefs to arrive at a conclusion at Key West later in

March. (4)

Apart from

a

hurried drafting of an extended version of

"Grabber", - a Short-Term Emergency Warplan, - surprisingly approved

unanimously by the JCS, no direct JCS response was provoked by the

.
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Communist Coup in Prague.

The JCS believed that the US was in
no

imminent danger of war in the spring of
19^8. (5)

The Berlin Blockade.

The Berlin crisis occasioned by what was

seen as Soviet provocations stopping land
communication to West

Berlin, was, on the other hand,

military leaders.

a

cause of greater concern for the

However, in neither case did the JCS revise their

perception of Soviet intentions.

Repeatedly, the hardline image of

the Soviet desire for communist domination of the world by the
use

of every conceivable means short of general war.

Some studies made

by the JCS organization show, however, an increased alarm by the
still growing tensions, by the less likelihood of diplomatic

agreement on any important issue, which, acording to the

intelligence advisers, made the international situation more

combustible than in 19^7.

The possibility of an outbreak of local

wars and of their escalation to general war was enhanced. (6)
The increased concern resulting from these two incidents seems
to have been caused by the frustration over the political impasse

rather than caused by

a

change in the image of the Soviet

intentions
This confirms my suspicion that once the perception of Soviet

intentions was fixed in the summer of 19^6 it remained unchanged;
what really concerned the JCS from then on was what they should
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propose in their military plans if war
should come.(7)

Planning for War, 1948.

Once the hostile and aggressive nature of
the Soviet Union had
been detected, the military concerned itself
with planning for the

case of a general war.

Soviet provocation,

a

The plans were thought to be

a

response to

a

deliberate but limited provocation from Russia

which miscalculated American resolve.
The role of the atomic bomb was most crucial in US strategic

planning.

The Winning Weapon by the Yale historian Gregg Herken and

especially the article on the Hydrogen Bomb decision by David
Rosenberg offer valuable insights on this point. (8)
"Grabber” was the 19^8 version of the first theoretical plan for
war with Russia called "Pincher,” drawn up in the summer of 1946.

Herken points out that "Grabber” was still

a

"tentative” plan which

reflected the Chiefs' uncertainty of American ability to respond to
a

war situation. (9)

The war plans "Pincher”, "Broiler” and "Grabber" deserve further

attention, because the plans illustrate very well the step by step

development in the JCS perception of the Russian threat in terms of
perception of own capabilities and in terms of perception of Soviet
capabilities.
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"Fincher'* wes the first of a series
of Joint Basic

Outline Plans, (JBOWP) .which were drafted
beginning the late spring
of 19^6.(10) "Fincher” anticipated

a

repeat of WW II.

The plan was

for a conventional war three years later; it
assumed that the

American atomic monopoly was not broken.
"Fincher" assumed that Russian capabilities consisted of much
Isrger ground and tactical air force with limited range than the

Western Allies,

The Russian naval forces were not frightening, but

the fleet of submarines was found to be impressive.

According to

the plans, the war would begin with a Soviet attack on the Western

Allies,

The Soviet forces could overrun West Eureope very quickly.

They would destroy allied occupation forces in Germany and seize the
Channel coast of France and the Lowlands in order to neutralize

Great Britain,

Spain would be passed through to get to the

Mediterranean,

France would be seized.

They would take Turkey and

the Middle East to gain control of th eastern Mediterranean and of

the oil of the Middle East,

Yugoslavia would take care of Greece

and parts of Italy,

"Fincher" reveals JCS uncertainty about American capabilities,
and JCS concern about a large standing Fed Army,

It

furthermore

reveals that the JCS had limited knowledge about the stockpile and
1

the rate of peacetime production of the atomic bomb.

Bases in

Europe were supposed to be established for strategic air offensives

.

3

(
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against vital industrial centers and
against population centers in
the Soviet Union.

These air offensive strikes were the only
hope

for allied victory.

There was

list of 2o targets and an

a

indication of which bases the targets could
be reached from.(n)
The James Schnabel, a JCS historian,
does not mention the

drawback regarding these targets.

Herken points out that in order

to reach these targets the aircraft had to
travel a distance that

exceeded the capacity of the bombers of the time.

Goals set forth

by the new plans. "Broiler” and "Grabber." did not
change the fact
that there was a difference between goal and capacity, i.e..
the

number of bombers to carry out the planned atomic raids and enough
trops to perform evacution functions. ( 12)

"Broiler" and "Frol ic"/"Grabber"

developed into

a

In August

19^7 "Fincher" was

Joint War Plan called "Broiler".

It was another

plan to meet hostilities forced upon the US by Soviet aggression

within

a

frame of three years.

As in "Fincher" the allies of the US

would be Canada and Great Britain.

1

)

"Grabber" 's assumption of the use of atomic bombs is

a

clear

departure from "Fincher", because it indicates an increased

confidence in the military advantage of the atomic bomb.
Furthermore, political rather than industrial factors had become
more important in the selection of the targets, stressing the
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psychological effects rather than the devastating
effects on Soviet
industry. (1^0
Finally, "Broiler” assumed the war goals were
the defeat of
Russia and

a

liberation of East Europe compelling Soviet
withdrawal

to 1939 boundaries and a political restructuring
of the its Union to

ensure Soviet abandonment of its policies of political
and military

aggression. (15)
In March 19^8 the JCS approved an abbreviated version
of the

plan for future planning.

War Viewed by individuals.

Below the JCS level, the plans and the question of the

decisiveness of the atomic bomb were the subject of considerable
disagreement.

The JCS was not able to take any formal action on

”Frolic"/"Grabber".(16)
Admiral Leahy approved "Grabber," but had reservations regarding
the use of atomic bombs.

He had never been an advocate of the bomb

and saw it as a danger for the military ethic, which he supported,

of separating civil and military targets. (17)

The Early Admirals' Revolt.

The Chief of Naval Operation, (CNO),

6H

Admiral Denfeld argued against an excessive
reliance upon an atomic

offensive as indicated in "Frolic" and "Broiler".

Denfeld was also

very concerned about the abandonment of
Western Europe to the
Soviets without

struggle.

a

The warplan was in conflict with US

foreign policy and national objectives, he
said.

The plan accepted

the loss of the Mediterranean leaving the
oil of the Middle East

inadequately defended.
Was Denfeld 's argument against the plan caused
by lack of an

appropiate naval role rather than concern for the
decisiveness of
the air offensive?

Her ken seems to think so: '’Unmentioned by

Denfeld in his memo, but in fact at the heart of his objection to

"Grabber" was its willingness to abandon the Middle East and the

Mediterranean, from which the Navy hoped to stage carrier-launched
atomic strikes against Russia in wartime"

.(

1

8)

The same author

mentions also that Denfeld pointed out two overseen assumptions of
the plan: (a)that the President would automatically authorize the

use of atomic bombs, and (b)that Russia would fold up after the

initial atomic attack. (19)

Therefore, Denfeld'

s

for the role of the Navy.

criticism seems to go beyond the concern
He stresses that the atomic offensive

would have to be carried out at extreme ranges and against heavy

opposition.

If they turned out to be unsuccessful, the initial loss

would be on such

a

scale that ultimate victory would be extremely
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uncertain.

The strategy he argued overemphasized Soviet
capabilites

and underestimated the potential capabilities of the
Allies of the
US. (20)

The Denfeld criticism thus contained both elements derived
from
a

concern for

a

future role of the Navy and from concern for the

plausability about the strategy based upon an offensive atomic
response as the decisive turning point.
The arguments preceded what was to be called the Admirals’

Revolt, which was

a

week long series of hearings in the House Armed

Service Committee in October 19^9, following the cancellation of the

production of the super-carrier ”USS United States."
called the Air Force's reliance on the B-36 bomber

a

The admirals

billion dollar

blunder . (21)
The reaction to the Navy’s arguments from the government and the

public was very negative, and Denfeld was fired. (22) There was

a

disgust with the Navy’s arguments seemingly selfish concern in the
name of national security.

The argument amongst the services over

who was going to deliver the atomic bomb to the Russians was so

intense that the American government felt it necessary to calm the

Russians about the likelihood of any such action. (23) The Russians
had had their first atomic test in September 19^9 and the debate

surfaced in October.

Nevertheless, the core of the debate seems to be the confidence

of the decisive effects of offensive bombing.
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—
a

Re port.

During late 1948. an ad hoc committee
headed by

senior Air Force officer. Lieutenant General
Hubert Harmon, was

analyzing the effects of an atomic offensive
through May 1949.

it

was, according to Rosenberg, one of the major
strategic analyses of
the early cold war

,

based on an extensive study of intelligence and

interviews with leading experts. (24) Its conclusion
was approved

unanimously.

It contained severe criticism and concern over
the

atom blitz which was the core in War plan "Grabber”.
The Harmon Report argues that strategic air offensives would

reduce Soviet industrial capacity by 30 to 40?.

Atomic offensives

would not bring about capitulation, nor destroy communism or weaken
the power of the Soviet leaders.

The psychological effects of use

of atomic bombs could turn out to be counterproductive.

It would

furthermore create destructive reactions detrimental to destructive
effects which would complicate post-hostilities. (25)
In sum, the Harmon Report emphasized the psychological

disadvantages that should be anticipated by any use of atomic bombs
against the Soviet Union, and warned that the atomic bomb was not

decisive weapon in

a

general war against the Soviet Union.

Inter-Service Rivalry.

The inter-service rivalry is not an

exclusive American phenomenon.

Discussion about the functions and

the role of the services prevented the US from getting

a

unified

a

(

(
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strategy at this point. (26) Samuel Huntington
argues that the
interservice rivalry was

a

child of unification, whereas Stein

claims that the rivalry was caused by the fixed
ceilings on the
total military budget. (27)
The above mentioned dimensions of the conflict were
all present
at the heated meetings in October about the
1950 budget. (28) The
14.1 billion dollar level or national bankruptcy attitude
that the

Truman administration used must certainly have increased the
pains
and the strains within the newly unified military organization.
(29)

There is little doubt that the JCS thought the reasons for the

lack of comprehensive planning were political.

my mind, however,

In

it is more conceivable that is was a chain of factors that produced

the situation; the deadlock was due to a lack of understanding by

Truman of the incompatible nature of the alternatives between which

decisions were to be made, i.e., small budget vs large conventional
forces.
In May 1948 Truman rejected Halfmoon, a JCS approved postwar

Joint Emergency War Plan, the keystone of which was the destructive
and psychological power of the atomic weapons against Soviet

military capability, 30 ) Instead
conventional forces alone.

a

plan should be made based on

Ironically, the decision of rejecting

plan based on the atomic bomb started

a

process which made final

American dependence on an atomic air offensive.

31

)

a
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The small budget made it impossible to meet
the requirements of
a

conventional type of force, i.e., the only way
the JCS saw an

emergency could be met in

war with Russia would be air strikes

a

from Cairo-Suez area or bases in the British
Isles.

decisiveness of such
which made

a

a

plan was questioned by

a

The

competent committee

profound study based upon intelligence and other

relevant material.

The services became dependent upon

a

weapon upon

which they had no real confidence, except perhaps for the
Air Force
- a confidence that was further moderated by the
military's

perception of domestic opinion, which they feared would not let the

military use the atomic bomb.
further the bomb's value as

a

This public opinion questioned

deterrent of war.

Conclusions.

By 19^8 the international political system had become more

bipolarized.

The increased tensions between the superpowers were

expressed by the first grave cold war crises - the coup in Prague
and the blockade of Berlin - which brought along the first fear of

war into the postwar system.
The adversary relationship with the Soviet Union evidently

provided

a

new determinant for the external threat to the US: the US

had gotten a powerful enemy in peacetime for the first time.
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Once the enemy had been identified, the
military advisers

suggestions for

a

proper military posture were more frequently

expressed in plans of war: the war planning was
intensified and by
1947 it had evolved into three categories:

(a)emergency plans for

the immediate implementation for the forces at
the current time,

(b)intermediate plans which were based upon budget and
industrial

mobilization two years ahead and (c)long-range plans forcasting
trends eight to years into the future.
As we saw, the JCS planners expected a repeat of WW
II or rather

the process of the previous war would take place on the basis of
the

increased mobility and firepower that had resulted from the

technological innovations developed during the war.

The atomic bomb

was just a bigger bomb and did not impose any need for strategic

revisions.
The plans foresaw that the new enemy - very similar to the

former enemy in important respects such as incompatible nature of
the political regime and its intent and threatening amount of

military-industrial resources - would proceed like the former enemy
by taking most of Europe and the Middle East.

To be sure, the JCS

warplans provided for measures to be taken after major parts of
Europe and the Middle East had fallen.

The decisive turning point

would be the air offensive against the Soviet Union's main

industrial, political and population centers, as the decisive
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element for the defeat of Germany had been
according to popular

wisdom of the time.

Skepticism regarding the decisive effects of
such air offensives
which were provided by the major strategic
air offensive report
after the war is not seen to have been reflected
in the internal

debates. (32) A change of staff prevented the
planners to take the

lessons of the report into consideration.

memory is

The lack of corporate

critique raised against the JCS organization to which

a

staff officers by statute only can be assigned for three
years and
not reassigned for the next three years. (33)

However, the Harmon Report and the "Early Revolt of the

Admirals" show that there was indeed

a

discussion concerning the

plausibility of the atomic air offensive as the decisive turning
point in a possible war with the Soviet Union.

In fact, the Harmon

Report concluded with an explicit warning against the use of atomic

bombs during such offensives.
based upon

a

Regardless, by 19^8 the warplans were

reliance on the atomic bombs.

There is little doubt that the JCS perceived the politically
imposed ceiling on the total military budget as the major

determinant for their planning.

The budgetary ceilings were only

one factor in an array of constraining elements such as the

inter-service rivalry between the Navy and the Air Force, the

discussions over the decisive elements of the envisioned strategies.
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the skepticism regarding the atomic bomb, and
the conflicting nature

of the political demands for economy as well as
conventional defense

capability.

This caused

a

significant frustration among the JCS

planners.
We shall now see how events in June 1950 provided for

political atmosphere which brought about the means for the

realization of the planning ideas.

a

new

.
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CHAPTER

IV

WHAT CAN THE ENEMY DO?

The Setting

Tine

International System.

1

950.

International stability seems to have

been restored temporarily by the Truman administration's responses
to what was seen as Russian provocations in the crises
of

19^18

By 1950, the international system was characterized
by a

military

px5 lar

ization created through formal military peacetime

alliances, in addition to the already existing political

polarization.
Inter-State Relations.

growing more antagonistic.

The US-USSR relationship was still

Conflicts over issues from the

settlement of WW II had not been resolved.

The North Korean attempt

to resolve the Korean issue through a massive armed invasion of

South Korea almost succeded.

The invasion of South Korea was seen

by Washington as directed from Moscow.

It was the climax of the

growing tensions that had characterized the relationship between the
two superpowers since 19^5.

The JCS Perception of Soviet Capabilities.
75

76

Of capabilities and intentions, the
two main elements in the

perception of the external threat to the US,
it seems as if the JCS
planners deduce what the Soviet Union will
do, from what they can
do,

i.e., that the planners deduce the intentions
from the

capabilities.

We shall see how.

The Implications of U]e Soviet Atomic Test.

A

major change in JCS

perception of the Soviet capabilities followed the Soviet
atomic
test in September 19^9.

During the remaining part of 19H9 and the

following year the JCS undertook revisions of the studies of
Soviet

capabilites based upon

a

series of estimates.

They were preoccupied

with what to do.
The explosion of the Russian atomic bomb broke the American

atomic monopoly.

Longrange war plans like Dropshot, which outlined

the scenario for atomic warfare against Russia in 1957, were

dropped.(l)
The Joint Emergency War Plan named "Offtackle", which had been

approved by the JCS as late as December 1949, noted that the USSR
would not have an atomic bomb available in FY 1950.(2) The plan

differed from its predecessor, Halfmoon-Fleetwood-Doublestar

,

by

a

less exaggerated view of Soviet capabilites and by stressing

coordination with the new allies.
oil was downgraded

.( 3)

The importance of the Middle East
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During this time very little emphasis was placed on
Russian

intentions; Russia’s capabilities were the principal concern.

It

seemed more frigthening what the Russians would do, now that
they

could do it, i.e., "Pearl Harborize" American defenses.

A JCS

document argued that:
As the Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs increases, however, the

danger of a paralyzing surprise attack by the Soviets against the
United States is also increased, if their capability of delivery has

increased proportionately and if the United States defenses remain
at about their present strength. "(^O

The citation clearly indicates increased concern for capability
over intentions.

Furthermore, the same document offers evidence for

the military reasoning in this respect.

"Full reliance," it said,

"can never be placed upon military intentions since it is impossible
to know the minds of one's opponents and practically impossible to

know and weigh accurately the factors from an opposite viewpoint.
It

is most important," claims the JCS,

"that any assessment of the

risks inherent in the United Statess situation of disparity of

military forces vis-a-vis the USSR be made with the military
capabilities of the USSR in mind rather than Soviet intentions. "(5)
As a matter of fact, it was not the event of the explosion as

much as the incorrectness of the planners' assumptions regarding
Russia and the bomb that stunned the JCS organization. (6) The focus

.
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on Russian capabilities created an
atmosphere of fear and

uncertainty in which officials failed to reexamine the
political and

military assumptions.
and Kennan.

Such

a

reexamination was sought by Lilienthal

But by 1950 Kennan had lost his
influence. (7)

In my opinion, the change in the relative
weight of focus on the

Russian intentions during the first postwar years to the
focus of

Soviet capabilites at the end of the decade may have been
ing

,

because it precluded any concern for a possible

change in Russian diplomacy towards

a

more cooperative attitude on

the major issues of conflict which may have been indicated since the

Russian's felt less insecure.

Invasion of South Korea

The invasion of South Korea was the

climax of the growing tensions between the superpowers since the
war.

Unlike the NSC's intial report, NSC 73, that expected the

invasion to be an isolated incident, the JCS expected that it was
part of an all-encompassing Soviet plan.
NSC 73 underestimated further aggression.

a

The JSC argued that the

JCS believed that

a

progressive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the
USSR should be taken as

initiate

a

a

warning that the Soviets might wish to

third world war.

The JCS stressed the growing Soviet

military capabilites and voiced the need to strengthen the power
position of the non-communist world.

It

believed that the US should

.
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abandon

purely defensive policy, and suggested instead

a

political, economic and psychological offensive.
should take place via the UN.

a

The offensive

The JCS warned, however, that

reliance on the UN as the sole instrumentality for any of
the US
vital security interests would be
unwise. (8)
The

fall of China” and the Soviet bomb had given the conditions

for deciding on the H-bomb in January 1950.

The NSC 68 papers

outlined the goals for American security and prescribed the means

especially for the conventional forces.
provided

a

The invasion of South Korea

climate for approval of money to do what the military had

proposed ever since the early years of the cold war.
The unexpected early bomb for some planners had indicated that

the Soviet Union might start a war not out of miscalculation.

The

JCS seems to have revised its perception on Soviet intentions after

June 1950, as we just saw regarding the comments regarding the

invasion
In August

1950 an ad-hoc committee to the Joint Intelligence

Committee, (JIC)

,

reveals

a

forcasting of Soviet moves.

rare theoretical sophistication in the
In most of the reports studied

regarding this subject, the Soviet hostile intentions basically were
deduced from the aggressive nature of

a

totalitarian regime,

referring to the Soviet policies and demands against the US desires
as evidence that confirmed the perception.

80

The JIC report states that the
Soviets would risk

a

war despite

their belief that the downfall of
capitalism is inevitable.

The

report, in referring to actions and
policy statements, argues that
the Soviets see an inevitable
downfall through the use of force or

revolutionary uprising whenever expedient.
requisite to the establishment of

a

A major war is the

communist dominated world.

The report continues that there is still
extensive support for
the idea that the Soviets would attempt to
reach their goal of world

domination without resorting to armed force.

Some believe that

Soviet faith in the decay and ultimate collapse of the
capitalist
world would tend to deter the Soviets from unnecessary use
of armed
force.

On the other hand, the report indicates that Soviet doctrine

emphasizes that the politics and war are inseparable in achieving
international objectives.

The JIC refers to the Stalin dogma that

war is simply politics by violence.

Korea thus corresponds to

Soviet doctrine. (9)
The invasion of South Korea made the JCS revise its view of

Soviet intentions; although the JCS perception of Soviet political

intentions had become more sophisticated, the JCS view of Soviet
political aims remained the same as it had been established during
19^6.

The JCS perception of Soviet military intentions assumed an

increased Soviet aggressiveness.

The JCS now questioned the

validity of prior assessments of the Soviet threat which rested upon

.
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the assumption that the USSR would not
start

a

war except by

miscalculation
These assumptions had already been incorporated
in NSC 68, the
first draft of which had been forwarded to Truman
in April 1950.

A

revised version, NSC 68/2, was approved by the President
on

September 30, when events seemed to have confirmed the
paper's
validity.

The NSC 68 paper became the definitive statement of

American national security policy. (10)

Increased Militarization of the Cold War.

The NSC 68 study can be regarded as

a

culmination of the process

of cold war policy formulation which was initiated by Kennan's

"Long Telegram" in February 19^6.
NSC, but in

a

The paper was not drafted in the

special interdepartamental study group of members of

the Departments of State and Defense.
As part of the decision to build the super bomb, the hydrogen

bomb, Truman requested

a

review of the cold war policy.

Paul M.

Nitze, who succeeded Kennan as director of the Policy Planning
Staff, (PPS), of the State Department became the chairman of the

interdepartamental study group.

The NSC 68 can be understood as the

(
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final drafting of the containment policy
which initiated by the an

interdepartamental effort, the Clifford report, in the late
summer
of

19116.

The actual drafting of NSC 68 and the weight of
the analysis

indicated two important differencies from the Clifford
report in
terms of (a)JCS participation and (b)preoccupation
with Soviet

military capabilities.

NSC 68.

The JCS recommendations of late fall of 1949 and

January 1950 carried
the h-bomb.

lot of weight in Truman's decision to build

a

The JCS had only a peripheral role in the drafting of

NSC 68.(11) The JCS role regarding the NSC 68 was that of approval.
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC)
,

,

represented JCS in the

State-Defense collaboration; it did not involve any delegation of
JCS authority. ( 12) Among the JSSC members only Major General Truman
H.

Landon, USAF, actually attended the sessions of the Study Group

that drafted the paper
a

.

The JCS had in fact decided against having

JCS representative on the State-Defense study group.

The decision

was consistent with long-standing JCS policy. 13 ) The budgetary

policy of the Defense Department was challenged by the PPS people.
The JSSC men did at first demonstrate views loyal to the current

policy, but were not long in coming to agreement with the PPS

members of the Study Group.
assumed

a

The Study Group's recommendations

sharp increase in defense spending.

s
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The JCS agreed with the JSSC endorsement
of the JSC paper and

offered to promote the views if necessary.

In fact the JCS urged

that the entire -Staff Study” be supplied to
Truman and not merely
the summary report.

The JCS advice was followed.

Acheson and Johnson endorsed the plan.

Both Secretaries

Johnson's endorsement came

as a surprise considering Johnson's public stand on
the economy. (1H)

Perhaps Johnson's recommendation was based upon the favorable

opinions rendered by the JCS, the Service Secretaries and the
chairman of the Munition's Board. (15)

Although the JCS had little influence on the drafting of the
study, which was dominated by the State Department, the paper only

continued on already ongoing trend in the JCS perception of the
external threat.

The JCS was hardly opposed to the prospects of

increase in the military budget.

NSC 68

'

View of Soviet Military Capabilities.

The NSC 68 reflects

an analysis that is based predominantly upon Soviet military

capabilities.

Perception of Soviet intentions derived simply from

perception of Soviet capabilities.

a

The traditional concern of

Soviet conventional military strength compared with American

weakness was replaced by
capabilities.

a

new concern for Soviet nuclear

The study projected that, by 195^, the USSR could

produce 200 atomic bombs which would make the USSR able to lay waste
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the British Isles, destroy Western
European industrial centers and

deliver devastating attacks upon the U.S.(16)
Because the Soviets devoted twice as large

a

proportion of their

GNP to military purposes, the USSR
was widening the preparedness gap
over the Western Powers.

Soviet capabilities in the year of 1950

were 175 divisions of which 55 were armored
or mechanized, 18,000 -

20,000 aircraft and 250-300 submarines.

Soviet block forces could

overrun Western Europe, except the Iberian and Scandinavian
peninsulas, launch air attacks against the British Isles
and launch
atomic attacks against selected targets in North America and
the
United Kingdom. (17)
The USSR was approaching military superiority.

If the current

trend continued the Western Powers would not be able to oppose

effectively Communist military power even in I960.
Diplomacy was not

a

likely way to settle the cold war.

courses open to the US, the NSC 68 recommended

a

Of four

build up of

political, economic and military strength in the free world. (18)
This course was recommended over the option of war, which the US was
not perceived able of winning quickly, over the option of pre-WW II

isolation, which would be

a

capitulatipn and would reduce US

retaliatory capabilities, and over the option of continuation of the
current policies, which would entail
in US military capabilities.

( 1

9)

a

continuing relative decline
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The Korean War created a climate of national
emergency by the
end of the year in the climate of which it
became politically

possible to start the conventional rearmament
that was desired by
NSC 68.

In early July,

the JCS had set, optimistically, FY 1952

force objectives to 10 divisions, 218 combatant vessels and
58

wings. (20) The NSC accepted in NSC 68/3 in fact JCS force
targets
for FY 1954 as force objectives for FY 1952.(21) The administration

accepted 18 divisions 397 vessels and 95 wings.

Truman approved the

plan as NSC 68/4 in December of 1950.(22) It said: "The aggression

by the Chinese Communists in North Korea has created
and a situation of great danger.

a

new crisis

Our military build-up must be

rapid because the period of greatest danger is directly before us.
A greatly increased scale and tempo of effort is required to enable
is to overcome our present military inadequacy

(23)

Conclusion.

NSC 68’s design for conventional rearmament of the US military
and the later approval was a major turning point in the history of

the cold war policy making.

It did not indicate a change of the JCS

perception of the Soviet threat.

The real change was in the

perception of government officials to abandon the belief of
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dangerous inflationary increases following
increase in military
spending. The principal concern now was the
change in Soviet

military capabilities that had occurred in the
fall of
consequence of the unexpected early Soviet atomic test.

as a

The JCS

believed that the danger of war was enhanced, because
of the
increased military capabilities of the USSR.

invasion of South Korea was

a

The North Korean

first proof of the validity of their

perception.

The Korean War entailed a massive conventional

rearmament.

The H-bomb decision demonstrated tendency of the

traditional warplanning to balance the US weakness in conventional
forces with nuclear deterrence.
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CHAPTER

V

CONCLUSION

International System at Mid-Century.

The 19^5 American dream

was a future world order of cooperation under
international law,

a

world free from spheres of influence and from exclusive
alliances,

a

world order not based on the balance of power but on self

determination and democracy regulating from the international

organization of all peace-loving nations.
The 1950 reality was radically different on all these points.
And so was the American view of the world.

Raymond Aron calls the

transformation that took place from 1945 to 1947 "the finest hour of
American diplomacy. "(

1 )

international relations.

Truman had accepted Stalin's view of
Aron seems to indicate, however, that

American diplomacy learned the lesson too well, i.e.

perception became too schematic.

I

the American

agree.

JCS Perceptions.

The JCS Perception of Soviet Intentions.

In chapter two we saw that

within the American government in 19^6, the top military advisers,
(the JCS), were concerned with the external threat to American
89

(
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security.
In this paper,

I

have dealt with the perception of the Soviet

Union’s intentions and capabilities in the first
years of the cold
war and the interrelated perception of US capabilities.

In the

formative years of the cold war, the focus of the JCS
seemed to
change from

a

concern of what the Soviet intentions were in

what American capabilites were.

I9146

to

Ironically it seems as if the fears

of American weakness, due to the unexpected intensive demobization
or liquidation of American military forces, determined the

perception of Soviet intentions as much as the events, if not more.
The military concern over American inability to defend Western

Europe has long been known.

The present study indicates that the

anxiety was an ever present element in the JCS's perception of
Soviet intentions and capabilities.
The JCS seems to have become increasingly concerned with Soviet

intentions as US demobilization proceeded.

The first studies of

Soviet postwar intentions and capabilities were intiated for this
reason.

The JCS feared that the military was not able to resist or

defend any Soviet military activity against Western Europe. 2 )
The perception of Soviet intentions changed from viewing Soviet

policy during the very first months of the postwar era as part of
pattern of defensive Russian expansionism to

a

a

view of Soviet policy

as part of an aggressive bid for Soviet domination.

Although the
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evidence given for the Russian motives
seem hasty and simplistic assuming such behavior of

a

totalitarian regime - there is no

evidence in the documents that
JSC purposely developed

Such

a

a

I

have seen that indicates that the

threat because they needed one.

thesis has been advanced by several scholars, such
as

Yergin and Sherry.

In order to justify the raison d'etre for an

extensive peacetime military force, it is claimed that the
military
needed

a

threat of considerable magnitude and likelihood to change

the traditional American anti-military attitude not to
reduce the

military back to prewar insignificanse and isolation.

Sherry

demonstrates that key military figures believed that the only thing
that could stop the rate of demobilization was

a

public awareness of

the external threat.

Moreover

,

the fear of

a

repeat of the WW II experience seems to

have been another powerful factor.

The Soviet Union was objectively

speaking the only power that fitted the expectation of
enemy; it had all the qualifications of

a

a

potential enemy.

Did the JCS alarmist perception prompt the cold war?

cannot be conclusive.

My answer

Most of the top government officials were

concerned about the Soviet intentions.
of degree: a) concern,

future

b)

The difference is

very concerned and c)alarmed.

a

It

matter

does not

break down on institutional affiliation, nor does it break down on

defense or non-defense officials consistently.

The problem

.
.

92

Indicated deserves further study of
diaries and other primary

material

PjHception of ^o viet ^pabilities.

In chapter four we saw that

from late 1945 the JSC planners assumed
that the American military

would only be able to defend the Western
Hemisphere.

The Soviet

Union was perceived as capable of taking without
much difficulty
Turkey, Iran, the Persian Gulf, Manchuria, Korea,
North China, in no

more than six months.

Only Great Britain could be successfully

assisted
American resources for industrial mobilization were greater
than

any nation of the world.

The core of the problem, however, was that

there would be no time to mobilize the resources, in case of war.

When evaluating Soviet capabilites, the planners frequently stress
the central planning and the lack of public opinion as

a

Soviet

asset for rapid mobilization of the economy, which would balance
some of the overall weaknesses the Soviet wartime economy would have

relative to the American economy.
The Soviet economy was, however still perceived as too weak

after the war to support

a

general war.

The JCS did not expect that

the Soviets would start a war, except by miscalculation.

The JCS

was impressed by Soviet military capability, despite the economic

weakness.

The JCS did not ignore the threat that this military

capability posed regardless of Soviet intentions.
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Of the Soviet intentions and capabilities,
the JCS seems to have

emphasized the latter more than the former.

We saw that the JCS

argued that it is sounder to rely upon
what the enemy can do instead
of what enemy would do, because you will
never know and weight

accurately the factors from the opposite view point.

Perception of American Capabilities.

Chapter three revealed

that the JCS’s proposals were diplomatic as well as
military.

The

JCS was requested to provide military analyses of the alternative

outcomes of the various international issues of conflict.

The

military planning consisted of warplans, which included the tacit
assumptions of who the enemy was and what he was up to.
of the war plans seem to have followed

a

The goals

development similar to the

hardening perception of Soviet intentions.

As the early estimate of

Soviet intentions caused concern, the later ones caused alarm.

military proposals changed from being

a

The

pragmatic, moderate response

to become a proposal for absolute defeat of the Soviet regime and

liberation of Eastern Europe.
How did the JCS perceive the domestic political conditions?

The

JCS documents reveal that it was aware of domestic conditions such
as a)public pressure for demobilization and a return to a civilian

economy, b)the unwillingness to spend money on defense, c)public

pressure against the use of the atomic bomb reducing the value of

deterrence that the bomb otherwise
would have had.

There Is no

evidence in the documents that the
military perceived the domestic
front as a bigger threat to national
security than the external
threat.
The unification of the armed forces
by 19H7 was only one of many

domestic constraints outside the military
organization that made any

comprehensive strategy possible.

The ceiling on the total military

budgets of the Truman administation tended to
intensify the debate
between the services of who should do what.

What seems to have been

the core of the problem was military skepticism
about the

plausibility of the atomic air offensive as the decisive
turning
point in any future plan, as wars were planned at the
time.

This

concern was present together with the disagreement about
who should
deliver the bomb.

These concerns were publicly debated at the time;

not known was the secret debate within the military
establishment

concerning

a

proper strategy.

The Harmon Report shows the profound nature of the debate.

The

Report indicated that the planned atomic offensive would not be

decisive, but rather counterproductive by increasing the Russian
will to resist.

It also shows a sophistication in the perception of

Soviet Union in making

a

distinction between the Russian patriotism

for the nation and the Russians'
It

attachment to the Soviet regime.

is interesting to note the American Ambassador in Moscow, Walter

.

95

B Smith argued before the Harmon Committee
that Moscow was a holy

city that the US should not bomb.

The only hope of success was

through the destruction of Central Russia.
a war

But he warned that such

would be a war of annihilation. (3)

Ironically, despite the serious doubts, the JCS maintained
the
strategy, but was not able to reach

a

final agreement of the

"Grabber” that was based upon the above air offensive, because on
lack of economic means for any alternative.
The Russian atomic test and the "fall of China” in 1949

intensified the planning efforts, which resulted in the famous NSC
68

.

The goals and the JCS's perceptions remained basically the

same, although the feeling of emergency was greatly enhanced from

time period to time period that we have examined.
The invasion of South Korea was

However

,

a

climax and

a

turning point.

the perception of civilian officials concerned with foreign

policy changed more than the perception of the military officials.

Sources of JCS Perception.

A Strange Pattern

My findings show that the pattern of JCS’s

perception and proposals regarding the external threat to the US

security follows

a

strange course.

JCS perception of Soviet

intentions was determined by its views of US capabilities rather

96

than an understanding of Soviet
behavior and ideology,

jcs

perception of Soviet capabilities was
determined by its views of
Soviet political and military intentions
rather than intelligence
estimates.

JCS proposals in terms of military
plans were determined

by the experience of WW II. service
interests and budgetary ceilings
rather than the lessons of WW II and new
technological development.

Organizational Interests or

W n

?

The shift from the

subjective actor oriented approach in chapter two
to the objective
observer oriented approach in chapter three
permits us to understand
the relative weight of WW II and the vested
organizational

interests.

A

clear indication of fear of

a

repeat of the traumatic

experiences of the 1930's and the first half of the

19il0's is

manifested by the analogies between Hitler and Stalin.
The experience was shared by all government officials and

included a certain commonly held belief of social causality, i.e,

diplomatic appeasement vis-a-vis an expansionist power would lead to
war

.

Because this belief did not depend upon organizational

affiliation, it may explain why the alarmist hardline view of Soviet

intentions after the war did not break down consistently along the
spectrum of defense - non-defense officials.

Organizational

interests of the different services indicate the lack of

comprehensive planning and disagrement of strategy.

The war

planning confirms the dictum that generals fight the last wars.
the warplans were also determined by the scarse funds available.

But

Even though the JCS may not have
been significantly influential
in respect to crises decisions,

the JCS may have had

impact when it comes to formulation of policy.
of the first JCS of the postwar era carried

they spoke.

a

a

significant

The military heroes

lot of weight when

The influence of the JCS was determined by WW
II rather

than the new role of the US military.

During the period from 1945 to 1950, the JCS sometimes
believed
that the Soviets intended to carry out military
operations that the

JCS thought the Soviets did not have the military capability to do.
The inconsistency between JCS' perception of Soviet intentions and

capabilities may be explained in terms of vested service interests.
It may also be explained in terms belief of what caused the two

world wars in the 20th century.

cause of WW

I

The textbook explanation of the

is miscalculation and misperception.

The textbook

explanation of the cause of WW II is one of betrayal and rational
piecemeal expansionism for world domination.

The JCS believed that

the Soviet were pursuing the latter, but at the same time the JCS

feared the former.

.

,

Notes.

(1) Aron, R., ^he Imperial Republic
United States and the
World 19^^5-1973, (Englewood Cliffs: Printice
Hall, 19714)
Tij;
p

(2) An indirect support for this argument
is that the studies
were discontinued when the JCS found that the
responsible
politicians and the public had become properly
informed; they did
not believe that the information alone would
change the public mood
regarding the demobilization; only the threat
of a direct attack
would

(3) Minutes 13th Meeting, 16 Februar
CCS 373 (10-23-48)B.P., P.T.
No.
2,N.A.
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Figure

1.

The National Security Establishment.

Figure 1 shows the agencies of the National Security Establishment
created by the National Security Act in 19^7.
Source: Etzold, T.H., and Gaddis Lewis, J., eds., Containment
Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 19^5-1950, (N.Y.: 1978), p
:

Figure 2. Organization for National Security, 19^71 Representation.
SANAAC: State-Army-Navy-Air Force Cordination Committee.
(Previously SWNCC)
NSRB: National Security Resources Board.

Source, Etzold, T.H.,

and Gaddis Lewis, J., eds., p 11.
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ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SFCURITY.
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Chart

The JCS Organization on

1,

1

November 19^2.

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Conc ise
History of the
of STaff, 19^2 - 1978, Historical DivisiorTT
Joint
Secretariat, 1979.

Chart 2. The JCS Organization on

Source

:

1

Same source as chart 1.

April

19^15.
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3.

The JCS Organization on 22 October 19^7

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
zation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Secretariat, 1979.
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Concise History of the Organi9^2 - 1978 Historical Division,

The JCS Organization on 23 August 19^9

Source: As chart
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A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The information for this thesis is provided by official

documents of which there are three kinds.

The most accessible is

the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series published

by the State Department.

Less accessible is the publication of the

JCS’s Historical Division on the history of the JCS in National
Policy.

For the postwar period, only volumes covering the period

until 1952 have become declassified so far.

historical account for the record.

These volumes are an

The account made by the JCS

historians by means of traditional historical methods, as they put
it, have not been formally approved by the JCS and do not

necessarily reflect their official point of view.

The volumes are

thought to have an intructional value for new officers assigned

within the JCS organization.

Available are the the unclassified

editions that were provided after the process of declassification of
the original sources.

A few pages seem to have been deleted

the original top secret publication.

from

Otherwise, according to the

Historical Division, the text of unclassified edition has no

addition nor reinterpretation.
The JCS volumes are primarily based on the official documents

contained in the master records files of the JCS, where the majority
of sorces cited in the footnotes have been declassified.
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file is identified by the prefix, CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff),
and is available in the Modern Military Branch of the National

Archives in Washington D.C.It is the least accessible group of

documents used here.

It has been used to evaluate the two

categories of publications mentioned before, and deals in depth with
problems
The case file system originated in 1942 under the Combined

Chiefs of Staff; therefore the prefix CCS is attached to each file
folder.

Each subject matter within broad categories was given

a

number and put either in the decimal group for the general material
or in the geographical part, dealing with regions and countries.

Take, for instance, Truman's letter, sent

requesting its proposals concerning
capabilities.

a

matter

reexamination of US

It is the first document in the case that contains

the JCS material for NSC 68.

Such

a

Januar 1950, to the JCS

31

The label is CCS 381 US (1-31-50).

system facilitates later research on

a

particular subject

,
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